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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I provide a possible explanation of why nominally risk-free bonds are essential
in monetary economies. I argue that the role of nominal bonds is to serve as record-keeping
devices in intertemporal exchanges of money. I show that bonds can only serve this role if
they are illiquid (costly to exchange for goods). Finally, I show that in economies in which
nominal bonds are essential, welfare and nominal interest rates are both positively associated
with the supply of illiquid bonds (if that supply is small).
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those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
In many societies, individuals trade both money and nominal bonds. Often, as with
Treasury bills, the bonds are essentially risk-free in nominal terms, and so they provide little
beneﬁt over money itself in terms of risk-sharing. Why then does a society ﬁnd it beneﬁcial
to have both money and nominally risk-free bonds? To put the question in the jargon of
monetary economics, What kinds of economic frictions lead to bonds and money both being
essential?
In this paper, I provide an answer to this question. I show that in the equilibria of
monetary economies, individuals may have diﬀerent marginal rates of substitution between
current and future consumption. Hence, individuals would like to engage in additional in-
tertemporal trades of money. To make these intertemporal trades work, though, there must
be a credible record of who received money in the past and who gave up money in the past.
I argue that the role of nominal bonds is to provide this credible record. More precisely,
I show that if nominal bonds exist, some households can give up bonds for money, while
others receive money for bonds. Later, the holders of the nominal bonds can exchange them
for monetary interest rate payments. In this way, nominal bonds serve as a record-keeping
device in the context of intertemporal monetary exchanges.
In making this argument, I ﬁnd that it is important to distinguish between illiquid
and liquid bonds. By illiquid, I mean bonds that cannot, because of physical or informational
reasons, be exchanged for goods. I show that illiquid bonds can be used as a record-keeping
device for intertemporal exchanges of money, but liquid bonds cannot be. In this sense, I
endogenize the illiquidity of bonds by showing that it is eﬃcient for bonds to be illiquid
rather than liquid.
I formalize these arguments in a cash-in-advance model and a random-matching model
in which agents experience unobservable shocks to their marginal utilities of consumption.
I look at the consequences of adding three types of durable tokens–money, liquid bonds,
and illiquid bonds–to these economies. I prove three results. The ﬁrst is that, given the
presence of money, liquid bonds are inessential: they can be eliminated with no loss in welfare.
Intuitively, liquid bonds are equivalent to money, and there is never any reason to have both
types of assets.The second result concerns the essentiality of illiquid bonds. I show that the unob-
servable taste shocks lead to illiquid bonds’ being essential. In particular, agents with a high
temporary need for consumption sell bonds and buy money; agents with a low temporary
need for consumption do the opposite. As discussed above, illiquid bonds provide a way
for agents with relatively low current consumption needs to credibly commit within an asset
market to forgo consumption today in exchange for future consumption.
Finally, in environments in which illiquid bonds are essential, higher nominal interest
rates are associated with higher welfare. The last result is contrary to the analyses of optimal
monetary policy in representative agent cash-in-advance settings. There, zero nominal inter-
est rates are optimal, and there is an inverse relationship between welfare and interest rates.
The intuition behind my result is simple. If illiquid bonds are essential, then adding a small
amount of illiquid bonds improves welfare. But with an increased supply of bonds relative
to money, the price of bonds has to fall. Thus, in any economy in which nominal bonds are
essential, we should expect small increases in the supply of bonds (when the supply is in the
neighborhood of zero) to lead simultaneously to higher interest rates and higher welfare.
I derive these three results in two particular model environments. However, I argue
that they are robust. The inessentiality of liquid bonds is an arbitrage argument and, as
such, should be true in virtually any environment. Similarly, the positive association between
welfare and interest rates when illiquid bonds are essential is a basic demand/supply story
and, again, should be true in most environments. The essentiality of illiquid bonds is more
delicate: it hinges on the agents’ having diﬀerent nominal intertemporal marginal rates of
substitution and on these diﬀerences being diﬃcult to observe.
It is important not to confuse the goal of this paper with that of a related stream
of literature. There are many papers in monetary theory that ask the question, Why do
individuals simultaneously hold money and bonds, even though bonds appear to generate
the same ﬂow of payments at a lower price? This question about individual behavior is
fundamentally diﬀerent from my question about societal behavior. My paper instead asks
the question, Given a choice between bonds that are costly to use in goods transactions and
bonds that are not, why do societies ﬁnd it eﬃcient to use the former? My paper endogenizes
transaction costs: it shows why it is socially optimal for interest-bearing bonds to be costlier
2to use in goods markets than money is.
Throughout, I am agnostic about the source of this illiquidity. (I embed illiquidity in
the model environments by assuming that bonds are not portable tokens.) There are many
possible sources of this illiquidity. One is that the technology for detecting counterfeit bonds
is available only in the asset market, not the goods market. Another is that to prevent theft,
bond ownership may be costly to transfer to goods sellers. But I do not want to choose
between these rationalizations: the goal of this paper is to show that illiquidity, whatever its
source, has previously unappreciated societal beneﬁts.
I also want to distinguish my paper from those that rationalize the co-existence of
money and credit (among others, Corbae and Ritter (1999) and Townsend (1989)). In these
papers, a barren token termed money is essential because it can be used as a record-keeping
device for transactions among strangers. Simultaneously, though, it is not needed for record-
keeping within enduring relationships. In a similar vein, Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998)
show that in worlds with imperfect centralized record-keeping systems, money can be essential
because it helps ﬁll the “holes” in the centralized record-keeping system. In contrast, my paper
provides a rationalization of why it is essential to have two diﬀerent types of intrinsically
useless tokens.
There is one other paper to my knowledge that addresses the societal beneﬁts of
having multiple nominally denominated assets. Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright (1996) argue
that if bonds and money are both indivisible, then their co-existence provides societal beneﬁts
through improving record-keeping. I think of my approach as being a useful complement to
theirs: while indivisibility may well be an important factor in some situations, I doubt that
it is the whole story in all settings. In particular, in modern economies, the indivisibility of
money does not appear to be an important societal constraint.
2. Islands Environment
I begin by describing a simple islands economy. The environment is essentially that
used by many authors to motivate a cash-in-advance monetary economy.
3A. Physical Structure
There is a unit measure of households in the environment. Each household has two
members, a consumer and a producer. The households are characterized by a vector (i,j) ∈
{1,2}×{ H,L}; there are equal measures of the four types of households.
There are two types of perishable goods in this setting. The ﬁrst component of this
vector describes the types of goods produced and consumed by the household: type 1(2)
households produce type 1(2) goods and consume type 2(1) goods. The latter two components
are preference parameters. Speciﬁcally, a type (1,j) household has preferences representable
by





where ct is consumption of type 2 goods and yt is production of type 1 goods. I assume that
0 ≤ yt ≤ 1, θH > 1 > β, and θL =1 . Type (2,j) households have similar preferences with
the obvious changes in goods produced and consumed.
There are three islands in the world labeled 1,2, and 3. At the beginning of each
period, all households are located on island 3 together. This island has no endowment of
goods or means of production. Then the type 2(1) producers go to island 2(1), and the type
1(2) consumers go to island 2(1). On these islands, production and consumption take place.
All goods are perishable.
I make the following three assumptions about enforcement and information. The ﬁrst
two are standard ways to generate a role for money: I assume that there is no record-keeping
technology (other than the durable tokens that I describe later), and I assume that society
cannot impose any penalties on households. This means, among other things, that type 2
producers cannot be required to produce for type 1 consumers, because there is no way to
force them to do so. Finally, I assume that for a type (i,j) household, i is publicly observable,
but j is not.
B. Tokens
I investigate economies that are distinguished by the types of tokens that are available.
All of the economies have a durable and divisible token called money. Money can be costlessly
created by society (but individual households cannot do so).
4The economies diﬀer, though, in the availability of bonds. A bond is a token which
physically lasts for only one period: it physically disappears after the period 2 meeting of all
households on island 3. All of the bonds are nominal: immediately before a unit of bonds
completely depreciates, the holder can exchange it for a unit of newly created money.
There are two types of bonds: liquid and illiquid. A liquid bond is a bond which
can be traded on all islands at all dates. An illiquid bond can be traded only on island 3.
These diﬀerences in bond types can be physically interpreted as saying that bonds are either
portable or not.
In what follows, I measure holdings of bonds in terms of their nominal payoﬀ at time
of maturity. Thus, B units of one-period bonds refers to the payoﬀ of B units of money that
the holder receives in period 2. In a no-bond economy, all households begin life with M units
of money. In a liquid-bond economy, all households begin life with M units of money and B
units of liquid bonds. Finally, in an illiquid-bond economy, all households begin life with M
units of money and B units of one-period illiquid bonds.
The rules of exchange in all economies are the same. On island 3, agents trade money,
liquid bonds, and illiquid bonds in a competitive market. I denote the relative price of bonds
in terms of money in this market by q. On islands 1 and 2, the agents located on those
islands trade money, liquid bonds, and goods in a competitive market. I denote the period t
relative price of goods in terms of money in this market by pt. Thus, all of the economies are
essentially cash-in-advance economies, where cash includes both money and liquid bonds.
3 .R e s u l t si nt h eI s l a n d sE n v i r o n m e n t
In this section, I describe and prove the three main results in the paper. Note ﬁrst,
though, that because of the enforcement and record-keeping limitations, money itself is es-
sential in all economies.
A. Inessentiality of Liquid Bonds
The ﬁrst result is that any equilibrium allocation in the liquid-bond economy is an
equilibrium allocation in the no-bond economy. This is easily demonstrated through arbitrage.
In the liquid-bond economy, to avoid arbitrage opportunities, the relative price of money and
b o n d sm u s tb eo n ei nb o t hg o o d sa n da s s e tm a r k e t si np e r i o d s1 and 2. Suppose this were
5not so. In the period 1 goods market on either island 1 or island 2, there is a positive supply
of bonds and money. If the relative price of bonds in terms of money is less (more) than one,
then all households will hold only bonds (money). Hence, the relative price must be one.
But this kind of argument can be unraveled backwards to prove that the relative prices must
always be one. Given that this is true, we can replace all bonds with an equivalent amount
of money, and the liquid-bond equilibrium will then be a no-bond equilibrium.
The intuition behind this argument is clear. If bonds are as liquid as money, then
people will only hold money if nominal interest rates are zero. But then the bonds can just
be replaced by money: there is no diﬀerence between the two instruments at all.
Despite (because of?) its simplicity, the implications of the result are strong: adding
nominal bonds to a monetary economy only improves welfare if those bonds are at least
somewhat less liquid than money. Any essentiality of nominal bonds can be traced directly
to their (relative) illiquidity.
B. Essentiality of Illiquid Bonds
The second main result concerns the essentiality of illiquid bonds. I construct equilibria
in the no-bond economy and the illiquid-bond economy. I demonstrate that welfare is higher
in the latter equilibrium. Throughout, I assume that β > α. As we shall see, this assumption
serves to eliminate the inﬂationary distortion on household labor supply, which makes welfare
comparisons more straightforward.
No-Bond Economy
In the no-bond economy, if {pt}∞
t=1 is the sequence of price levels, a type (i,j) household









s.t. ptcjt ≤ Mj,t−1
ptcjt + Mjt ≤ Mj,t−1 + ptyjt
Mjt,c jt ≥ 0
0 ≤ yjt ≤ 1
6Mj0 = M.
Here, cjt is consumption in period t, yjt is production in period t,a n dMjt is money holdings
in period t. Because of the spatial separation in the environment, consumers in household j
have to use previously accumulated money balances to buy goods in period t. This “cash-in-
advance” restriction is embedded in the set of constraints in the household’s problem.
It is then straightforward to show that the following is an equilibrium:
pt = M for all t
cjt =1 for all t,j
yjt =1 for all t,j.
(My choice of numeraire rules out the equilibrium in which money is not valued at all. If
consumption goods were the numeraire, such an equilibrium would exist, and autarky would
be the equilibrium allocation.) In the Appendix, I prove that this is the unique equilibrium
for any θH.
Because they are liquidity-constrained, both types of households consume the same
amount of consumption in period 1. Note that this is not consistent with a ﬁrst-best Pareto
optimum, in which θH households would consume more in period 1 than the other households.
The unobservability of the household’s taste shocks plays an important role here. If
taste shocks were observable, the social planner could create new money and hand it to the
θH households before trading begins. In this way, households could be insured against their
taste shocks.
Illiquid-Bond Economy
In the illiquid-bond economy, if q is the relative price between bonds and money in
period 1 and {pt}∞



















j0 − p1cj1 + p1yj1 + Bj1
ptcjt ≤ Mj,t−1,t≥ 2
Mjt ≤ Mj,t−1 − ptcjt + ptyjt,t≥ 2
Mjt,c jt,y jt,M
0
j0,B j1 ≥ 0
0 ≤ yjt ≤ 1.
This decision problem represents the sequence of markets that households face. In period 1,
households can trade money and bonds at price q. Then consumers take the available money
(bonds are illiquid) and buy goods. In period 2, households can use the money balances and
the payments from bonds to buy goods. From period 3 on, the decision problem is the same
as in the no-bond economy.
Given this decision problem, it is straightforward to show that the following is an
equilibrium for suﬃciently small B:
yjt =1 for all j,t
q = βM/(M + βB +2 B)
p1 = M
pt =( M + B),t>1
ch1 =( M + Bq)/M
cl1 =( M − Bq)/M
ch2 = M/(M + B)
cl2 =( M +2 B)/(M + B)
cj2 =1 ,t>2.
Let me explain how this equilibrium works. In period 1,o ni s l a n d3,t y p eH agents
sell all of their illiquid bonds at price q to the type L agents. Because they have more cash,
the type H agents can consume more in period 1 than type L households (note that the type
L households end up carrying both bonds and money into period 2). All households work
8the full amount possible, because they are at a corner; hence, they all carry the same amount
of money into the next period.
In period 2, on island 3,t h et y p eL agents receive the payoﬀ from their illiquid bonds.
Hence, they can consume more in period 2 than the type H agents. Again, in period 2,a l l
agents work the same amount. This ensures that in all future periods, all agents consume
t h es a m ea m o u n t .
It is straightforward to show that all agents are made better oﬀ in this equilibrium
than in the no-bond equilibrium allocation. In particular, it is budget-feasible for the agents
to spend M in period 1 a n dt h e ns p e n d(M + B) in period 2. This means that the no-bond
equilibrium allocation is budget-feasible in the illiquid-bond economy, but agents strictly
prefer not to choose it.
Thus, in this model environment, all agents are made better oﬀ by the introduction of
illiquid bonds. Both illiquid bonds and money are essential.1
C. But What About the Friedman Rule?
In representative-agent versions of cash-in-advance economies, it is well-known that
if the money supply shrinks at the rate of time preference (or at any rate at all, for that
matter), there is a Pareto optimal equilibrium allocation. (See Cole and Kocherlakota (1998)
for example.) This result carries over to the above heterogeneous agent economy as well:
if the money supply falls to zero asymptotically in the no-bond economy, there exists an
equilibrium in which the associated allocation is Pareto optimal. There is then no need for
illiquid bonds in the economy.
However, in the islands environment discussed in this paper, society cannot impose any
penalties on households. If such penalties could be imposed, then there is no role for money,
because producers could just be forced to produce for households. Without this ability to
impose penalties, it is not possible to shrink the money supply because there is no way to
force individuals to give up their money.
While logically correct, this argument may not strike all readers as compelling. For
1Note that agents would be even better oﬀ if they were allowed to trade one-period illiquid bonds on island
3 every period, not just in period 1.
9those readers, let me simply say that the above demonstration of the essentiality of illiquid
bonds does rely on the money supply being bounded from below. This bound could be
present because of some enforcement friction (as in this environment) or some technological
limitation that prevents money from being divided too ﬁnely.
In Levine (1991), the socially optimal allocation of resources is an equilibrium if the
money supply grows suﬃciently fast. It is important to check if this result is true in this
environment. If it were, then there would be no role for bonds, because the government
could (at least weakly) implement the eﬃcient allocation by simply injecting money into the
economy each period.
In the Appendix, I allow for the possibility that in the no-bond economy, the govern-
ment injects additional money into the economy at the beginning of every period via equal
transfers for all households. I show that for any weakly increasing sequence of money supplies
{Mt}∞
t=1 and any θH, the equilibrium allocation of resources is given by
cjt = yjt =m i n ( α
−1βMt/Mt+1,1) for all t and j = H,L
which provides less utility to all households than the equilibrium in the illiquid-bond economy
described above. Intuitively, even though the low-shock households are more patient than
the high-shock households, the low-shock households are still impatient (in the sense that at
their endowments, their shadow real interest rates are positive). It is therefore not possible
to separate the two types by using inﬂationary policy as in Levine (1991).
D. Welfare Beneﬁts of High Nominal Interest Rates
Now consider increasing the supply B of bonds in the above illiquid-bond economy. If
B increases slightly, then, since
q = βM/((2 + β)B + M)
q falls as B rises. Moreover, household welfare is increasing in B ( a tl e a s t )f o rs m a l lv a l u e s
of B. It follows that as M/B varies, interest rates and household welfare move in the same
direction.
104. Random-Matching Environment
I now show how these same results apply in a simple random-matching setup (similar
to that described in Kiyotaki and Wright (1991)).
A. Physical Structure
Consider an economy with a unit measure of inﬁnitely lived agents. There are equal
measures of three types of agents and, correspondingly, three types of indivisible, nondurable
goods. In any given period, type i agents can produce one unit of type i goods at utility cost
0 <c<1.
In all periods but the ﬁrst, type i agents receive utility beneﬁt 1 from consuming one
unit of type (i +1 )goods. In the ﬁrst period, a randomly determined half of the type 1
agents receive utility beneﬁt θH > 1 from consuming one unit of type 2 goods. All other
agents receive utility beneﬁt 1 from consuming one unit of type (i+1)goods. All agents have
ac o m m o nd i s c o u n tf a c t o rβ, where 0 < β < 1.
The physical structure of the environment is as follows. There are three islands. At
the beginning of each period, all type i agents are on island i. Within the period, agents are
matched randomly into pairs. The pairs are informationally and physically separated.
As before, there is no record-keeping technology (beyond the tokens described below)
and no enforcement technology. As well, the utility beneﬁto fp e r i o d1 consumption is private
information.
B. Tokens and Trade
As before, I study versions of the above economy that are distinguished by the nature
o ft h ea v a i l a b l et o k e n s . A l lo ft h ee c o n o m i e sh a v ead u r a b l ea n d ,a si sc o m m o ni nt h e
random-matching literature, indivisible token called money. Money can be costlessly created
by society (but individual households cannot do so).
The economies diﬀer, though, in the availability of bonds. A bond is a token which
physically lasts for only one period: it physically disappears after the period 2 meetings of
type i households on island i. All of the bonds are nominal: immediately before a unit of
bonds completely depreciates, the holder can exchange it for a unit of newly created money.
There are two types of bonds: liquid and illiquid. Here, a liquid bond is a bond which
11can be exchanged for money on any island at the beginning of period 2. In contrast, an illiquid
bond can be exchanged for money only on island 1 at the beginning of period 2 (so type 2
agents are not willing to accept illiquid bonds in exchange for goods).
I study three diﬀerent types of economies distinguished by the types of tokens available
for trade. In what follows, I measure holdings of bonds in terms of their nominal payoﬀ at
time of maturity. Thus, b units of one-period bonds refers to the payoﬀ of b units of money
that the holder receives in period 2. In a no-bond economy, a fraction m of households begin
life with one unit of money. In a liquid-bond economy, a fraction m of households begin life
with one unit of money and a fraction b of type 1 households begin life with one unit of liquid
bonds. Finally, in an illiquid-bond economy, a fraction m of households begin life with one
unit of money and a fraction b of type 1 households begin life with one unit of illiquid bonds.
In the bond economies, no households are initially endowed with both money and bonds.
As is standard in random-matching environments, I impose an upper bound on port-
folios. No household can hold more than one unit of money or one unit of bonds. However,
a household can simultaneously hold a unit of money and a unit of bonds.
I model trading in the pairwise matches in a rather standard way: type i agents
make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to type (i +1 )agents. (The results that I stress are robust to
perturbing this trading mechanism.) I refer to matches as being tradeable matches if they
involve a type i agent with a unit of money (and/or a unit of liquid bonds) and a type (i+1)
agent with neither money nor liquid bonds.
Bond/money trading on island 1 is more diﬃcult to model. Because all of the agents
are physically together, it makes sense to think of their trading in a large market, rather
than in pairwise matches. However, as we will see, agents with money will only be willing to
exchange it for a bond if the money is somehow worth more than the bond. This is diﬃcult
to model, given the indivisibility of the two tokens.
To deal with this issue, I adopt the following notion of trade on island 1. Trade is
competitive, with the market-clearing price being a probability of exchange of money and
bonds. Hence, given a bond price q, an agent with money who agrees to trade receives a
bond with probability one and loses a unit of money with probability q. Similarly, given a
bond price q, an agent with a bond who agrees to trade loses that bond with probability one
12and receives a unit of money with probability q. Ap r i c eq is an equilibrium if the measure of
bondholders who agree to trade is equal to the measure of moneyholders who agree to trade.
5. Results in the Random-Matching Environment
In this section, I describe how the three main results work in this environment.
A. Inessentiality of Liquid Bonds
It is straightforward to show that liquid bonds are inessential: Any equilibrium out-
come in the liquid-bond economy is an equilibrium outcome in the purely monetary economy.
To see this, note ﬁr s tt h a ti nt h ep e r i o d1 matches, sellers of goods view money, liquid
bonds, or a combination thereof as being equivalent. This immediately implies that the value
of holding money or liquid bonds is the same at the beginning of period 1. Hence, in the
period 1 money/bond trading on island 1, if q<1, no bondholder will agree to trade, and all
moneyholders will. It follows that in equilibrium, q =1 , and this equilibrium can be exactly
mimicked by replacing the liquid bonds with money.
B. Essentiality of Illiquid Bonds
Consider a no-bond economy. Suppose that a fraction m of the agents are endowed
with money, and suppose that c is suﬃciently small so that it is an equilibrium for money
and goods to always be exchanged in tradeable matches. In other words, suppose that
−c + β(Vm − V0) > 0
where
Vm =( 1 − m)[1 + βV0]/3+( 1− (1 − m)/3)βVm
V0 = m[−c + βVm]/3+( 1− m/3)βV0.
It is easy to show using simple algebra that
V
∗
nobond = m(1 − m)(θH − c)/18 + 5m(1 − m)(1 − c)/18
+β[m(1 − m)(1 − c)/3](1 − β)
−1
is the average utility of agents in this equilibrium in the no-bond economy.
13At this point, construct an illiquid bond economy by initially endowing a fraction b,
where m>b>0, of type 1 agents with illiquid bonds in such a way that no agent has more
than one asset. In this economy, I describe a particular pattern of trades and argue that if
θH is suﬃciently high and b is suﬃciently low, this pattern of trades is an equilibrium.
The pattern of exchanges has the following form. In the initial bond/money market,
all of the high-shock type 1 agents with bonds give up their bonds in exchange for money and
am e a s u r eb/6 of the low-shock type 1 agents with money give up their money in exchange
for bonds, at some price q in (0,1). After this market closes, money and goods are exchanged
in all tradeable matches.
Now suppose that agents are following this pattern of exchanges. We can then deﬁne
∆it(b,q) to be the period t utility beneﬁtt ot y p ei agents having money (as opposed to not
having money), given an initial bond supply b and a period 1 bond price q. It is straight-
forward to show that ∆it(b,q) is continuous in (b,q).A sw e l l ,∆it(b,q) is uniformly bounded
from below by zero, and so
∆
∗(b) ≡ inft,i,q∆it(b,q)=mint,i,q∆it(b,q)
It follows from the Theorem of the Maximum that ∆∗(b) is continuous in b. Since ∆∗(0) >c β
−1
(because ∆it(0,q)=Vm − V0 >c β
−1 for all i,t,q), it follows that there exists b∗ such that
∆∗(b) >c β
−1 for all 0 <b<b ∗. Thus, as long as b<b ∗, it is an equilibrium for agents to
always trade goods for money in tradeable matches, regardless of the value of q.
Suppose, then, that b∗ >b>0. We must now determine the equilibrium price q
in the period 1 bond/money market. Because b<m , bonds are scarce, and so it must be
true in equilibrium that the high-shock bondholders weakly prefer to give up their bonds
and the low-shock moneyholders are indiﬀerent between trading and not trading. The former
condition is easily satisﬁed by making θH suﬃciently large.
The indiﬀerence condition for the low-shock moneyholders is more diﬃcult. When they
give up their money, the moneyholders lose the ability to consume in period 1 (because bonds
are illiquid). However, they only give up their money with probability q. With probability
(1 − q), they keep their money and receive in addition an illiquid bond. This additional
illiquid bond gives them the ability to consume in period 1 without losing any future utility.
14In other words, to have indiﬀerence, it must be true that
−q +( 1− q)∆12(q,b)=0 .
(Recall that ∆12(q,b) is the utility diﬀerence for a type 1 agent between having money in
period 2 and not having money in period 2.) Clearly, from the Intermediate Value Theorem,
there exists some q that satisﬁes this equation (simply check the value of the left-hand side
of the equation for q =1and q =0 ) , and so there is an equilibrium of the required kind in
the money/bond market.
To sum up, we have constructed an equilibrium in which more high-shock type 1
agents receive a consumption good in period 1 than in the no-bond economy. This represents
aw e l f a r eb e n e ﬁt. There are three other (potential) welfare losses associated with this new
equilibrium. First, fewer low-shock type 1 agents consume in period 1. Second, some type 3
agents receive less consumption in period 1 (because type 1 agents with bonds do not want
to produce). Finally, the distribution of money across types is now unequal at the beginning
of period 2. All of these potential losses are ﬁnite and are unaﬀected by changing θH. Hence,
by making θH arbitrarily high, this equilibrium in the illiquid-bond economy will dominate
the equilibrium in the no-bond economy. In other words, illiquid bonds are essential as long
as θH is suﬃciently large.
This last argument should make clear why I assume that the preference shock impinges
only on type 1 agents. Type 1 agents with bonds do not produce in period 1.H e n c e ,i fs o m e
type 3 agents are hit by the preference shock, their welfare loss is proportional to θH. It is
then no longer clear that bonds improve welfare for suﬃciently high values of θH.
C. Welfare Beneﬁts of Higher Interest Rates
The ﬁnal result in this economy is that higher nominal interest rates may be associated
with higher amounts of welfare. To see this, note ﬁrst that ∆12(q,b) is a weakly decreasing
function of both q and b (increasing q and b increases the amount of money in period 2 and
therefore decreases the value of money in that period).
Now, increase b slightly. Since adding bonds improves welfare in the above economy,
we know that welfare is increasing in b for small values of b. As well, ∆12(q,b) declines. It
follows that to satisfy the indiﬀerence requirement for low-shock moneyholders, it must be
15true that q declines. Thus, welfare goes up along with an increase in nominal interest rates.
6. Intuition and Robustness
In this section, I ﬁrst argue that there is a strong intuition underlying the three main
results. Hence, even though they are derived in special settings, I conjecture that they are
true in a large class of environments.
Inessentiality of Liquid Bonds: Intuition
The ﬁrst result is that liquid bonds are inessential. The intuition behind this result is
that if bonds are liquid, then their price must always be the same as money, or bond/money
markets cannot clear. Hence, money and bonds are exactly equivalent instruments–there is
no need to distinguish between the two. This arbitrage-based result seems likely to be highly
robust.
Essentiality of Illiquid Bonds: Intuition
The second result is that illiquid bonds are essential. This result is more delicate,
because it depends on three frictions. The ﬁrst is that record-keeping must be limited.
Otherwise, whatever the bonds are doing could be done using a record-keeping technology.
Of course, as Kocherlakota (1998) emphasizes, without record-keeping limitations of some
kind, money itself is inessential.
At least in the islands economy, it is also important that enforcement be limited. If
there are no enforcement frictions, then by shrinking the money supply, the planner can (at
least weakly) implement a ﬁrst-best allocation of resources. Again, though, we know from
Kocherlakota (1998) and Huggett and Krasa (1996) that without some enforcement frictions,
money itself is inessential.
Finally, there must be some unobservable diﬀerences in the households’ intertemporal
nominal marginal rates of substitution in the purely monetary economy. The households
would like to eliminate this diﬀerence, but because of the above enforcement/record-keeping
limitations, they can only do so by using bonds as a record-keeping device.
There is a counterintuitive element to the essentiality of illiquid bonds: Why are
households better oﬀ using a less ﬂexible asset? The reason is simple. Households wish to
16engage in an intertemporal exchange of consumption. Because of spatial separation, they
can engage in these trades only in the asset market. So, in the asset market, a low-shock
household must guarantee that it is giving up ﬁrst-period consumption in exchange for more
second period consumption. The only way that they can do so is by buying bonds that are
not as liquid as money.
Again, the intuition behind this result seems fairly robust. In particular, I conjecture
that it will survive other ways of introducing diﬀerences in liquidity demands across model
entities. (For example, the result should be true in a setting with ﬁrms that need money to
hire inputs into production and that diﬀer in terms of productivity shocks.)
Welfare Beneﬁts of Higher Nominal Interest Rates: Intuition
In the illiquid-bond economy, larger bond supplies are associated with higher period
1 nominal interest rates and with higher levels of household welfare. Again, there is a simple
(and robust) intuition behind this result. In an economy in which illiquid bonds are essential,
adding a small amount of illiquid bonds makes agents better oﬀ (by deﬁnition). But increasing
the supply of bonds will typically drive their price downward and increase the nominal interest
rate. Hence, if illiquid bonds are essential, then higher nominal interest rates should be
expected to be associated with higher levels of welfare.
7. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to provide a rationalization of the co-existence of illiquid
bonds and money. The key ingredients in this rationalization are twofold. First, enforcement
is limited, and record-keeping is impossible except through durable tokens. Second, house-
holds are aﬀected by taste shocks that lead to diﬀerences in their willingness to substitute
money over time. These taste shocks are impossible to observe. Together, these frictions give
rise to a need for an auxiliary, illiquid record-keeping device.
The paper also shows that in economies in which illiquid bonds are essential, standard
welfare analyses of monetary policy must be revised. In particular, when bonds are essential,
increasing the supply of bonds leads to a simultaneous decrease in their price and increase in
consumer welfare. Thus, welfare and interest rates end up being positively associated.
This paper represents a ﬁrst step toward understanding the societal beneﬁts of having
17assets that diﬀer in their liquidity properties. It would be useful to extend the analysis to
account for ﬁner gradations of liquidity. I plan to address this question in future work.
188. Appendix
In this appendix, I consider an extended version of the no-bond islands economy
presented in the text. I allow for the possibility that at the beginning of every period,
households receive equal non-negative transfers of new money. I show that for any weakly
increasing sequence of money supplies, there is a unique monetary equilibrium in the no-bond
islands economy.
The proof works as follows. I ﬁrst show that there is a unique equilibrium in the case
in which θH =1 . I then build on this lemma to prove that there is a unique equilibrium for
all θH.
Lemma 1. Let {Mt}∞
t=0 be a weakly increasing sequence of money supplies. If θH =1 , there
is a unique equilibrium in which pt = Mt, cjt =1 , and yjt =1for all t.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that any equilibrium must be symmetric in that all
households have the same consumption-labor choices.
The ﬁrst part of the proof is that in equilibrium, if the multiplier on the household’s
cash-in-advance constraint is zero in any period t, then it must be zero in all future periods.
Let λt be the multiplier on the household’s period t ﬂow wealth constraint, and µt be the
multiplier on its period t cash-in-advance constraint. Suppose that µτ =0for s>τ ≥ t and
µs > 0. Then
β





t−s = ptct/Ms ≤ Mt/Ms
which contradicts the speciﬁcation that the money supply is weakly increasing.
T h es e c o n dp a r to ft h ep r o o fi st h a ti fµt =0for all t ≥ T, then the household’s





The ﬁrst two parts of the proof combine to tell us that µt > 0 for all t. It follows that
ptct = Mt
19for all t, and so all households consume the same amount in every period. Moreover, the
households’ labor supply ﬁrst-order condition looks like
−α + βpt/(pt+1ct+1)
= −α + βMt/(Mt+1ct).
If α ≤ βMt/(Mt+1),t h e nct =1 . If α > βMt/Mt+1, then ct = α−1βMt/Mt+1. Hence, in
equilibrium, yt =m i n ( α−1βMt/Mt+1,1) for all t.
The lemma (and its proof) can be used to prove the proposition that for any θH,t h e r e
is a unique monetary equilibrium, and in that equilibrium, the cash-in-advance constraint
always binds.
Proposition 1. Let {Mt}∞
t=0 be a weakly increasing sequence of money supplies. Then, for
all θH, there is a unique equilibrium in which for all j,t
pt = Mt
cjt = yjt =m i n ( α
−1βMt/Mt+1,1).
Proof. Consider ﬁrst an equilibrium in which, in period 1, the cash-in-advance constraint
binds type L households. Then the type L household’s solution to its choice problem satisﬁes
the ﬁrst order conditions of the type H household’s problem and therefore also solves the
type H household’s problem. It follows that the cash-in-advance constraint binds type H
households in period 1. From Lemma 1, we know that in any such equilibrium, the cash-in-
advance constraint binds both types of households in all periods (because they begin period
2 with equal amounts of money). Hence, we know that the only equilibrium in which the
cash-in-advance constraint binds type L households in period 1 has pt = Mt and cjt = yjt =1 .
Now I prove that there is no equilibrium in which the cash-in-advance constraint fails
to bind type L households in period 1. Consider such an equilibrium. From the logic in the
proof of Lemma 1, the cash-in-advance constraint must eventually bind type L households (or
their transversality conditions are not satisﬁed). Suppose that the cash-in-advance constraint
20binds ﬁrst in period s. Then, again using logic from the proof of Lemma 1,w ek n o wt h a t
1/(p1cL1)=λL1 = λLs + µLs = β
s−1/(pscLs)=β
s−1/MLs.
Moreover, because of the preference shock, type L households spend no more in period 1 than
type H households, and therefore MHs ≤ MLs. It follows that MLs >M 0. But this implies
that M0 <p 1cL1, which violates the cash-in-advance constraint. It follows that there is no
such equilibrium.
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